Saturday, August 11, 2007

One Serb's "Endlosung" to the "Albanian Question", Part 2

Another "Final Solution" to the "Albanian Question", this one a bit more "modern" (though no less barbaric) comes to us from-SURPRISE! SURPRISE!-Dr. Vojislav Seslj, founder and former head of the Serbian Radical Party. I did make a link to this in a previous post, but I thought that it too deserved to be shown in all it's "glory" as well. (And of course, anyone who thinks I'm being "mean" or "unfair" to "Those Poor Serbs" by publishing something like this, you're more than welcome to try to refute, "debunk", or disprove it's authenticity or anything else about it. Go on....knock yourself out.)

One thousand years ago, the cornerstone of Serb statehood, of its national consciousness and culture, was created in Kosova and Metohija. Ever since, no other legal state has existed in Kosova and Metohija. Of all the peoples living and working in these territories throughout this time, the roots of the Serb people are the deepest and most extensive. One cannot imagine a Serb state without Kosova and Metohija. Therefore, keeping Kosova and Metohija as an integral part of Serbia is as important as keeping the Serbian nation alive. The migration of Serbs and the abandonment of their ancestral homes in Kosova and Metohija became the destiny of the Serb people. Ottoman rule and the atrocities of Islamized Albanians who settled there subsequently brought about conditions under which life for Serbs was impossible. People had no other choice but run as far away as they could in order save their children; run away without looking back, to abandon homes, property, the cemeteries of their grandfathers; to seek safety in Serbia or elsewhere. The migration of Serbs from Kosova and Metohija occurred between the two world wars, while the settling of Serb volunteers there -- warriors first and foremost -- maintained to some extent the Serb presence here. Regrettably, this only lasted till World War II, when, first the occupying fascists, and then the Communists resumed the driving out of Serbs and settling a great number of emigrants from Albania. During the period of time 1944-45, the Communist regime prevented the expelled Serbs from coming back and repossessing their homes, acknowledging as a fait accompli the remodeling of the ethnic structure of the region. At the same time, the Albanians were rewarded with autonomy in Kosova and Metohija which was to serve them later as a foundation for their secessionist policies. The effects of such an anti-Serb policy resulting in a great number of Serbs leaving Kosova and Metohija. Albanian usurped hundreds of hectares of both state- and Serbs-owned private land, whereas monasteries, cemeteries and other sacred places of the Serbs became subject to systematic devastation. In the late 1980s, in a bid to hold onto power, the Communist regime in Serbia announced that it would pursue a just national policy and set out to solve the Kosova and Metohija issue. Serbs were misled by the emendation of the Serb constitution, by which the decision-making authority was given back to the Parliament. On paper, Serbia became a unified state, while promises of the Serb president paved the way for the return of Serbs to Kosova and Metohija. That was an historic opportunity which the current Serbian regime failed to fulfill. The policy the Belgrade regime has been pursuing vis-a-vis Kosova and Metohija is motivated chiefly by sheer political considerations, failing thus to address the real interests of the Serb people. With the consent and pressure of international community, the regime has quietly allowed the secessionist movement of Albanians to get stronger, create de facto a parastate called the Republic of Kosova and internationalize the Kosova issue. Once the Yugoslav federation crisis is settled, it becomes very much clear that the Serb issue must be by all means resolved through the unification of all Serb territories into a single state. Aware of the alarming situation in Kosova and Metohija, which is deteriorating at breakneck speed; bearing in mind the treachery the Serb regime has committed against its fellow nationals in Republika Srpska and the Serb Republic of Krajina, one can easily expect the same thing to happen to Serbs in Kosova and Metohija. Distressed by statements of foreign officials who maintain that the issues of Kosova and Metohija, Raska province (Sandjak) and Vojvodina should be solved within the frameworks of the crisis in Yugoslavia; being aware that the national consciousness and the future of the Serb people is unimaginable without Kosova and Metohija as an unalienable part of the Serb state; convinced that the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, has created a blueprint for a treachery against sacred Serb land to deliver it to Albanian secessionists, we are hereby stating the following goals of Serb national policy in Kosova and Metohija, and the necessary measures for accomplishing such goals and crushing by all means the secessionist insurrection of Albanians in Kosova and Metohija. In order to thwart the effects of this insurrection, we are committed to see the following issues settled urgently:

Reorganization of the state

To reorganize the state and change the current federation and territorial autonomies because these autonomies have proven to be fatal to the Serb people. The best solution would be to design a single state that would include in it the Serb Republic of Krajina, the Republika Srpska, the Republic of Serbia and Republic of Montenegro. The Serb state would have one president, a single parliament, a single government, while regions would be mediators between the local administrations and the the central government. The Serb state should be a national and democratic state of Serbs and citizens and other ethnic groups, to whom all individual, civil and civic rights would be guaranteed. The abolition of the existing autonomy of Kosova and Metohija -- by which a fatal disparity was created in Serbia and provided for the Albanians a basis to demand secession -- is the core element in accomplishing the Serb national issue. The Serb people now carrying out a demanding struggle for the unification of all Serb lands must consider as its foremost priority the keeping of all territories within Serb borders. The complete inclusion of Kosova and Metohija into a unique Serb state is an internal matter, and it must be resolved as such and without outside arbitration by the so-called international community. A settlement of the status of Kosova and Metohija as an integral part of the Serb state as well as a settlement of all other issues related to realization of a modern and democratic state of law can only be achieved by creating a new constitution. The constitution can be promulgated by a constitution-making parliament elected in a direct ballot by all the people in the country. The national policy toward Kosova and Metohija cannot be achieved without having it discussed by the appropriate bodies of parliament and without the consent of the legitimate representatives of the Serb people in Kosova and Metohija. Taking into account the fact that a considerable number of national minorities live in Serbia, they would, in conformity with international standards, enjoy all individual and collective rights, i.e., the right to using their languages in judicial matters, the right to be educated in their own languages, the right to their religious services, cultural activities and so forth. However, a complementary requisite for enjoying such rights must be their obligation to show loyalty to the state of which they are citizens.

Revision of the citizen registers and citizen rights on the basis of the 1991 census

It is very necessary that the federal parliament urgently adopts the law on citizenship. The law would define the number Albanian immigrants and their predecessors, who have in an illegal way over the period 1941-1987 acquired property and other estates no one could ever achieve in any other country. There are around 400,000 such foreigners in Yugoslavia today, Such a law would prevent them from living any longer in our state. Similar standards should be applied to all citizens of the seceded republics, unless they are of Serb nationality, and to all minorities who refuse to accept citizenship in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Some 400,000 refugees from seceded Yugoslav republics could be settled in their stead, a legitimate act of the regime. Two rules should be applied in eliminating the immigrants: those who have been proven to be extremists will be immediately expelled, while others must possess the proper documents, the most important being the citizenship certificate, something none of them of course has. This 'fatherland certificate' must have on its cover page the Serb coat of arms: the white double-headed eagle of the Nemanjics, and the crest with four Cyrillic Ss. The failure to possess this paper would be the basis for expulsion. The repatriation of Albanians temporarily working in foreign countries must be prevented, especially those who left during the 1990-1993 period (it is estimated that they number some 300,000). Employment should be denied to people of certain vocations which would compell them to leave the country. Albanians are in this respect very adept -- on the one hand because they have supporters in many countries, and on the other it fits their mentality to live in other countries. Such measures would first and foremost affect the educated portion of their population, so that the rest could be easily manipulated and not be able to organize resistance.

Revision of land ownership laws

In regard to revising ownership status a special law should be promulgated by which all Albanian-owned land and other wealth will be given back to Serbs and the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova and Metohija. The church used to be in possession of large estates and it maintained welfare activities with the local population. By enlarging its land and estate, the monasteries could in an optimal manner perform their religious, cultural and national mission. They could also help the Serb people meet and prevent their further migration. In the events that took place in the second half of 20th century, it was only the Serb priests who did not move from Kosova. So, owing to their patriotism and their right to inheritance, they deserve large estates. The land that was sold to Albanians or has in one way or another ended up in the hands of Albanians, especially over the period 1966-1987 (during the Communist and Ballist [Albanian National Front] rule), as well as estates acquired by Fascists during World War II, should be given back to their Serb owners or/and their successors. This could be carried out easily because Albanians in most of the cases have not built new houses but have only knocked down those existing ones so that Serbs could not have a place to go if they decided to return. Albanians have done this because they feared that the situation might change and their illegal appropriation of estates could not last forever. During the socialist [Communist] reign, agricultural cooperatives and collectives were exclusively established on the estates and in the villages of Serbs, thus there is a serious need for reprivatization to give those estates back to their previous owners under the condition that they live on them. If not, the land should be offered to new owners. There is plenty of state-owned land that can be either allocated or sold to Serbs coming from outside Kosova and Metohija. The land must be allocated to private owners, for the state has not handled it properly. In addition, the land of agricultural cooperatives is adequate for settling on it significant numbers of colonists, who, by living there, could be more capable of developing welfare, social, defense and other activities. There is plenty of such land all over Kosova and Metohija. It is very easy to concentrate on such lands Serbs who could maintain close cooperation with other such centers to provide assistance in development. The establishment of chains of such settlements is achievable in the regions of Decan, Prizren and Suhareka, where, by expelling the Albanians, a strong defense barricade against Albania could be secured.

Changing the ethnic structure of the population

The colonization of Kosova and Metohija should be carried out quickly and conclusively. Through political propaganda, colonists could be portrayed as Serbs populating Serb land and it is all the same which part of the country they live in as long as they live in their own land. These Serbs should also be supplied with equipment and long-term loans so they can cultivate the land they are granted which would make them stay there. Most of the Croats from Janjeva and Letnica [two Kosova regions where some Croats lived and still do], guided by ethno-centrism, left for Croatia without any pressure whatsoever. Their property has been either sold to Albanians or was plundered by Albanians from adjacent regions. Serb refugees from Croatia should be settled in those homes and estates. Besides confiscating the land from Albanians which they illegally expropriated, all those who have pillaged the wealth and have occupied Serb territories must must pay the consequences pursuant to the Law on Banning the Repatriation of Serbs in Kosova and Metohija. The Law on Prohibition of Selling Estates should be fully respected and all efforts should be made to have its provisions fully and properly implemented. To this end, the foremost responsibility goes to the current Ministry of Finances (Treasury) of the Republic of Serbia, which has in fact mostly not enforced that law. Ethnic expansion of Albanians onto Serb state- or privately owned land must be foiled by all means possible. All Albanians who are not citizens -- something can be easily proved with a census -- should be fired from their jobs. All the Albanians who wish to leave will be given passports. Albanians of Yugoslav citizenship living abroad and/or involved in secessionist activities must lose their citizenship. Taking into account the current ethnic distribution (with only a few rural Serb enclaves and over 700 purely Albanian centers, while the few Serbs in owns have been virtually suppressed by the Albanians, we consider that the colonization should be carried out in an organized fashion, through establishing of new villages, settlements, small towns or new neighborhoods in existing towns). Such places should be of a closed type with an inner form of organization, i.e., medical services, entertainment, cultural activities, etc. In this way people can be divided along ethnic lines, while the minority Serb population in mixed neighborhoods in the towns would gradually move to the newly established enclaves, an idea which requires both support and motivation. In order to have the Serb enclaves protected, an Albanian population of 5 to 10 per cent should be installed there (a selection of distinguished families and those with authority). Highways should be constructed (up to 1 kilometer apart -- in a process that can be called "terrain configuration -- to cleanse a wide belt through Albanian enclaves and near other sites like military barracks, polygons, depots, etc. Near such highways the land and space must be allocated to Serb colonists, which would result in thinning the Albanian population of the territories, one element that provides a feeling of security for Albanians. These moves would create a "leopard spot" pattern of Serb enclaves that would grow and eventually become larger than the Albanian enclaves. Conquering territories in this way is more efficient than "planting" individuals in Albanian communities, for it does not raise ownership issues. The first method provides far more security for colonists, while the second is a more lasting process. The Serb enclaves would chiefly depend on state supplies and a small number of Serb-owned private firms, while Albanian areas would be supported mainly through private firms, which could be allowed to operate. The state could help private firms that don't operate efficiently. Further, electricity and water supplies to the Albanian enclaves can be disrupted to make their lives unbearable. All this will be aimed not only at having the Albanian population divided but utterly isolated too. But if the Serbs find the neighboring enclaves of Albanians attractive (with privately owned shops, entertainment etc.), these can be eliminated by prompting incidents in those enclaves, such as beatings and violence. The fundamental prerequisite to efficiently control the flow of goods and capital is to prevent corruption in Kosova and Metohija and Serbia proper, for one has to bear in mind that Albanians are very good at cheating and bribing others. To prevent the flow of large amounts of capital through illegal routes - money should be strictly controlled by a well-organized banking system, frequent interventions of the fiscal police, rigid control of transportation and roads, attention to any kind of major change in the market, customs procedure and trade with dealers from abroad, financing political organizations, etc. All necessary measures should be taken to thwart the functioning of the Albanian private sector through permanent restriction of their activities, which could in turn result in maintaining rigid control over the funds of their political parties. Contacts with private firms and companies in Serbia must be prevented so Albanian capital cannot have a monopoly in Serbia. Through adequate legislation and efficient taxing policies, large amounts of money could be collected and used in financing programs like colonization . Paramount attention must be paid to drugs trafficking. If one Albanian is caught in such an activity, that must be used as a pretext to stalk and punish large groups of them. Such cases would discredit important personalities in the eyes of the Western world. This is a particularly sensitive issue for them because Albanians are already considered the main traffickers of drugs in the world. Rigorous measures should be undertaken against Albanian smugglers -- especially in tobacco. All this can result in serious social tensions if one bears in mind the fact that most of the Albanian population earns its living from selling things on the streets and by smuggling, practices which inevitably results in increase of criminal/illegal activities. However, we consider that through a strong and efficient police force, it is quite easy to make people seek refuge abroad. All steps should be undertaken so the capital of Albanians be channeled through Macedonia and Albania. The issuing of papers from state authorities (besides the seizure of passports) has to be as complicated as possible, with all those who fail to possess proper papers to be oppressively fined. Albanians like to stick to their tribal procedures in solving disputes and hate administrative intervention in the walks of life they consider important to them. Such legislation should be adopted which would force Albanians to ask for permission to even possess a cow. To promote such regulations will persuade them to go abroad, and then face serious impediments at the borders when attempting to come back. As for Serb enclaves the procedure should be less complicated, while in the cities where services are common to the whole community, like the Ministry of Interior, citizens of different nationalities should be treated in different ways. These procedures will undoubtedly result in dissatisfaction in their community which will be a precondition for a broad readiness for involvement in various organizations, including terrorist ones. Therefore, individuals from the state security must be "infiltrated" by agents who could pretend to press for establishing such underground or/and hostile organizations, or even become the leaders of such groupings. Such ruses could be exploited by the state as a pretext to undertake uncompromising actions against all their organizations which would result in inter-ethnic tensions and a further ruptures in their parallel life. To this end, more and more such groups are needed, while the police would now and then destroy one of them, which could then be allowed to consolidate again and look like genuine and "bona fide" organizations. Political parties of Albanians should be created through specific legislation and at the same time scandals should be created to discredit them. This could discredit their leaders in eyes of the domestic and foreign public opinion, a particularly sensitive consideration for Albanians. Distinguished individuals who play important roles in their political life should be eliminated through scandals or by staging traffic accidents, jealousy killings or infecting them with the AIDS virus when they travel abroad. Their infection would be discovered when crossing borders thus they could be quarantined. Through adequate propaganda in their mass media such events can create such an artificial picture of an intolerable percentage of infected people, which would be used as an excuse to isolate large groups of people. This would help in promoting a picture of Albanians as an infected people.

Information and propaganda

To broadcast special radio and TV programs in the Albanian language which would aim at eroding their patriarchal and tribal mentality by offering the most decadent values of the West, which can be easily adopted by primitive people. The Serb enclaves could be spared from such programs primarily owing to language barriers, as well as through establishing cable television in newly erected buildings and settlements for Serbs. It is fundamental to establish a powerful and efficient propaganda machinery to feed international public opinion, something which has been already used. Even an underground (secret) publishing activity must be originated to enable them to defuse the criticism against the Serb regime. Albanians must be denied all kinds of social assistance, for it has facilitated their high birth rate. This birth rate among the national minorities of the Moslem faith has resulted in a very high population in Kosova and Metohija. Such a thing creates a demographic surplus, therefore emigration of Albanians is indispensable and could be carried out without any pressure by the Serb authorities. A crucial element of the Serb national program is to have a third and fourth child. Serbia has enough space and economic resources to handle dozens of millions of inhabitants, hence an increased birth rate is important in every respect. In order to have the Serb birth rate increased, which would directly impact on Kosova and Metohija itself, scores of concrete actions must be undertaken, be that stimulative or restrictively, respectively. Serb mothers who have three, four or more children should be entitled to their retirement earlier. They must be granted children's allowance, regardless their family income. Planning and enlarging of families must be the top priority of all individuals, families and entire society. Serb families with more children must be granted loans for house and private business, they must be granted apartments, they must be given jobs and other facilities and incentives to bring up their children. It is necessary to open in Kosova and Metohija region military and police schools and academies, additional military institutions and other state institutions such as ministries which would facilitate the settling there of thousands of army officers, policemen, state clerks, together with their families, with the infrastructure needed for normal life. All the Serbs who wish to live in those areas must be given free, fertile land, construction sites, and sites for their private business. All those who locate their economic facilities there and have at least 10 employees, should be provided with abundant opportunities, such as being exempted from taxes for ten years.

Retired officers from the army, policemen and state clerks can have their accommodation/housing problems solved by allocating to them comfortable and maximally big apartments in the region of Kosova and Metohija. The border belt, a minimum of 50 kilometers adjacent to Albania should be used for settling Serbs. This would avert any danger of having the zone jeopardized, while the neighborly relationship could work in compliance with needs and interests of both sides. The border zone near Albania could be exclusively allocated to Serbs, while the rest of land would be the property of the Yugoslav army.


The education system in state schools should stick to elements and values of the Serb, European and world culture and art; the instruction language must be Serbian. Open perspectives and free development in Serbia are very attractive for the minorities. Schools in languages of minorities will be treated as private, while if one wants to have a job he will need a verification proving he has completed courses pursuant to the state curricula. A careful selection and normal inclusion of all positive Serb values and structures will be included in their education in this way. Following the overthrow of the Albanian parastate, the Serb University of Prishtine has made a radical change and it is in a good way to achieve enormous results, which directly determine the fate of Kosova and Metohija and the state itself. This course should be further stabilized and promoted, in harmony with the new needs and curricula. All the efforts should be made that conditions at the Serbian University of Prishtine be more favorable than in Serbia proper. Efforts should be made to further maintain and promote the current illegal parallel education of Albanians, because in this way they will have all the doors closed for employment and incorporation in the society. All these efforts should be made to have the population dispersed all over the world, including Macedonia and Albania. Such activities should be carried out concomitantly with various forms of pressure and creating feelings of uncertainty. All the tools, though modified to specific circumstances, should be used to prevent Albanian secessionists from having a job.


In order to have the Kosova and Metohija problem solved, the Yugoslav army must be turned into the Serb army. People from the republics that have seceded from the federation must be immediately driven out of the army, in the first place all those holding commanding posts, except those who have distinguished themselves as verified and gallant combatants in defending the freedom of the Serb people. Such an army would be more consolidated and more capable to solve complicated military and war issues, and, furthermore it could be less expensive. The Law on the Army should be so severe that it would oblige every citizen of Yugoslavia to make his contribution in defense of the country, while members of national minorities could contribute with money or labor. These issues must be arranged in details by a specific law. In the vicinity of the existing military bases it is necessary to intensify the settling of Serbs, while non-Serbs must not be allowed to build houses there. The current situation in this respect is catastrophic, therefore urgent measures are needed to have it changed. Some military facilities of a vital importance should be relocated to Serb enclaves, but at the same time they must maintain full control all over the territory of Kosova and Metohija through visits, maneuvers and other activities of the army. Within the army, it is indispensable to legalize the operation of professional Chetnik guerrilla units, who should be located in localities of strategic importance in Kosova and Metohija.


The police are a very important element of the state, responsible for keeping Kosova and Metohija as the permanent property of the Serb state. However, the police must be better trained and more professional than they are now. The police must have young and educated people, while all its members must complete additional courses. The police academy will play a crucial role in this respect. Police forces in Kosova and Metohija will be exclusively involved in protecting Serb inhabitants, as an endangered people in these areas.

Public Services

The route through which the Serb army withdrew in 1915 has significantly determined the direction of a future highway (Nis, Prishtine, Podgorica, Bar), which would in a solid way connect Serbia with Montenegro and the Adriatic Sea, via Kosova and Metohija. The realization of such a project must be a priority for the public services. Even during the international sanctions and economic crisis it is possible to have a rapid progress in this direction, which would have an epochal impact on the problem of Kosova.


The current situation in Kosova and Metohija can result in unpredictable consequences, especially if outside factors aim at implementing such a scenario. Therefore, particular attention must be paid to preventive actions, first of all by seizing all kinds of weaponry, in with licenses or without them, so to neutralize all paramilitary, para-police and para- territorial defense formations. If we have to fight a war to defend Kosova and Metohija, it should be fought with all possible means and have it finished as soon as possible. No talks or agreements should start with representatives of Albanians until the law on citizenship is adopted and until it is verified the exact number of those who recognize and accept this state as a state of theirs. To those Albanians who claim to be citizens of Serbia or Yugoslavia, respectively, the state should be more tolerant, and they can be incorporated into state and political bodies if they accept the Serb state and its laws.

A statement by Serb Deputy Prime Minister Voislav Seselj in Velika Serbija, The Greater Serbia Journal, Belgrade, Oct.14, 1995


François said...

1. Those black letters on a red page are almost unreadable. If you want to discourage readers, change nothing.

2. Why advertise for the enemy? Most people don't share your opinions; if you post the enemies' rantings without answering them sentence by sentence, they will end up being influenced by them.

3. If you really have to post a whole enemy text as a reference because you can't link to it, why not use an external website such as ?

4. Similarly, if you post a permanent list of the enemies' websites, visitors might go there, stay there and start believing their lies. Only link permanently to friends and neutral references and link to specific texts of the enemies in your refutations of their lies.

5. Study the enemy lest you be caught making mistakes about him. Learn at least enough of its language to avoid spelling mistakes and laugh at his.

6. All anti-Albanian people don't have the same basic motives; some just fear Islam and dont bother to make the necessary distinctions, some have no idea of Serb mendacity and can't imagine how much they have been lied to, some are only anti-American and would love the Albanians if they were, and even most of the fanatics simply haven't botered to examine alternative information. Conscious, deliberate, politically motivated and paid liars and other intellectual hoodlums are a minority and only those identified as such should be treated as such.

7. Most of their readers, and even they, have beliefs in common with you; show that you share those, that you are just exposing errors and trying to explain why some believe in them. Only those whose core conviction is Serbian pseudo-nationalism will ignore your arguments.

8. In particular, recall how much the Albanians like the Americans, and that the Serb leadership was allied with the worst Arab regimes (Saddam, Khaddhafi) and celebrated 9/11.

9. Serb mendacity is so outrageous that it may be enough to confront its dupes with one credible alternative opinion to shake their beliefs.
With that purpose in mind, use credible sources quote Western academics, refer to international organizations, journalists and politicians close to your targets' beliefs.

10. The main problem is ignorance; so the priority is to present the reality of the Albanians in a positive way. Show that the Albanians are human beings, that they have scientists, priests, writers, national heroes, natural parks

11. Advertise Albanians but since the essential problem is Serb (and Greek) aggressiveness and mendacity, also link to other victims of Serbian imperialism: the Croats, the Bosnians, to show that the source of anti-Albanian propaganda is not some Albanian defect, that it really comes from their oppressors since others have the same experiences.

11. Quote the minority of normal Serbs as much as possible. It will show that you are not against the Serbs either, that you only oppose a particular ideology (which happens to be prominent in their political practice), and really care for their common good. That shouldn't be difficult, since nothing is easier than to prove the damage Belgrade's imperialism has done to them.

12. At the same time, it will give you the most precious understanding of the enemy, since only those who live daily within a particular polity can understand its motives.

François said...
"Serbia Stagnates in All Aspects of Political, Economic and Social Life"

2006 Report on Serbia by the "Normal Serb"s at the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. Summary [they could use some help translating into English]:

Serbia’s stagnation in 2006 — marked by the system['s lack of interest] in establishing [an] efficient protection of human rights — is not only to be ascribed to the fact that her institutions have been devastated over the past 20 years, but also to her self-isolation and the advocacy of the concept of “a neutral” Serbia that relies on Russia, says the annual report of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

At the time of Slobodan Milosevic’s ouster, [a previous], major dimension of Serbia’s reality was not objectively assessed, […] as no heed was paid to the criminal legacy of the 1990s wars — the legacy [which now prevents] society ’from making] a breakthrough [towards] democratic transition and [confrontation with] the recent past.

Therefore, in the case of Serbia — with [a] poor overall potential — the concept of "transitional justice" has reached its maximum at this stage.

According to the 2006 annual report, objective limitations also condition Serbia’s movement towards European integration, [in] the European Union in the first place. As a failed transitional country facing numerous demands, Serbia is incapable of meeting European standards on the one hand, and “her new political and financial class (tycoons) would not let go [of] the positions acquired over the past 20 years” on the other.

As it turned out, pressures and the policy of conditioning are no longer effective in Serbia’s case, quotes the report,

“[since] her political elite is not truly willing to join Europe but would [rather] sacrifice Serbia’s future place in it […].”

In its latest annual report titled “Serbia in 2006 — Human Rights: Hostage to the State’s Regression” the Helsinki Committee underscores that Serbia was totally de-institutionalized in early 2007 after the parliamentary election.

“In spite of the clear-cut electoral outcome and popular vote, the lowest-ranking of the three leading political parties, [Kostunica's] Democratic Party of Serbia—  presently without legality and legitimacy — still holds the reins of political and social developments with the support of informal centers of power. At the same time this probably best testifies that Serbia functions as a “façade democracy.”

Moreover, says the report, Serbia’s disintegration nears the “dangerous point” at which she would be left without a mainstay for social and institutional consolidation, while her political class — once the Kosovo issue is resolved — will, to all appearances, continue looking for new enemies and thus endlessly postpone Serbia’s constitution as a state.

Last but not least, to properly understand Serbia’s true potential for democratization and Europeanization at this point what should be taken into account [is] not only overall impoverishment, internal turmoil and [an] undefined identity, but also the fact that, living in a bubble,

“Serbia has opted for a value[s] model that further takes her away from European civilization”

— the model that promotes intolerance to[wards] any otherness (which also implies the EU’s concept of multiculturalism) and thus fuels radicalism in Serbia proper.

On over 500 pages, the Committee’s report for the year 2006, deals with topics grouped in eight chapters — “European Option Denied,” “Constitutional System,” “Instruments of Actual and Spiritual Pressure,” “Socioeconomic Processes,” “Decentralization: A Developmental Imperative,” “Kosovo Status: The Final Stage,” “Minorities on the Margins of the Society” and “Foreign Policy Stagnates.”

Looking back at the year 2006, the Helsinki Committee pinpoints some prerequisites the government, the parliament, state institutions and [the] domestic public should bear in mind […] :

· ’A d]econstruction of the prevalent cultural model that [determines] daily developments [is a ] precondition [to] all other political and social reforms.

· Serbia should renounce [its] nationalistic policy, the one promoted by the government, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences [as it maintains] the mindset that generates intolerance, xenophobia, fascism and anti-Semitism.

· Full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal should be resumed, and the obligations [which] the verdict of the International Court of Justice entails [fulfilled].

· The 1990s wars, the role the former Yugoslav People’s Army played in ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration, war crimes and the genocide committed in Srebrenica should be interpreted and incorporated into regular school curricula, including those of military schools. This implies [lectures o]n the sentences passed by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia at military academies.

· Curricula at all levels of education should be amended, particularly the sections that apologetically interpret collaborationism [by the Nedic regime and the Chetniks] in the World War II, Serbia’s role in [the disintegration of] ex-Yugoslavia […] and all anti-Semitic ideologists and authors.

· Educational reform is not only an imperative need but also the only way for Serbia to develop a new value system and [become] a democratic society. The entire educational system should be get off the ground, primarily through modernized classes and new textbooks that would [no longer] imbue students’ minds with [pseudo]-national values, hatred [of] others and [a] false perception of world realities.

· Bearing in mind the region’s security problems, a [comprehensive] educational reform should be based on European values that would, in the long run, give rise to regional liberal elites, military elites included.

· The police’s centralized structure allows no possibility for forming police units at local level, which is an imperative need for countries such as Serbia. Besides, local authorities have no influence whatsoever on the police forces operating in their territories.

· Serbia’s new government and the Parliament should make it possible for courts of law and prosecution offices (the special departments for organized crime and war crimes in particular) to perform their tasks independently and professionally. This especially refers to a number of political crimes that still remain without [a conclusion] in courts of law.

· The judiciary as a whole still holds that the international documents Serbia has ratified cannot be directly applied. And even when applied such cases are improvised and marked by judges’ subjectivity that [does not rely]on […] international judiciary practice.

· Duties and responsibilities of governmental bodies should be laid down as soon as possible, and material and human resources upgraded with a view to securing overall protection of human rights of Serbia’s citizens.

· Social dialogue should be opened in search for the multiculturalism concept that maintains the identities of ethnic minorities but also their integration into overall social, political and economic community. What Serbia needs is a coherent, consequent and active minority policy and a republican law on minorities along with a law on the election of national councils. These law-making processes should be transparent and include [the] general public. Representatives of European institutions should be more involved in monitoring inter-ethnic relations particularly in Vojvodina, South Serbia and [the] Sandjak.

The 2006 annual report, in [Serb] and English versions, was published thanks to the assistance of the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. The Report is also available [at] the Helsinki Committee’s offices located at a new address — Riga od Fere St. # 20/V.

Belgrade, June 11, 2007

The whole report can be downloaded here (.pdf):

François said...

A Normal Serb of the left (!), reviewed by the last British Marxists. (Remember on the other hand that "Living Marxism", a British publication, peddled the sophistry of Belgrade disinformer Thomas Deichmann about the Trnopolje camp,2763,184815,00.html.)

Before they came to power and started plundering and massacring others in their turn, members of the Socialist movement were fortright about the others' imperialism. Thus, Trotsky described as a journalist the Serbian massacres in the northern Albanian territories in 1912 -1913, and the Serbian Social-Democratic leaders denounced their invasion and forced annexation.

The Titoite regime put forward the figure of Dimitrije Tucovic as an "internationalist" and forerunner of the "Yugoslavist" idea of a "free" federation of the Balkan peoples.
Of course, there is nothing "free" or "equal" in socialism, but what Tucovic wrote against the invasion of a "foreign land" by Belgrade's imperialism hasn't lost its relevance.
Dimitrije Tucovic: Serbia and Albania
Book review by A. Holberg

“Unlimited enmity of the Albanian people against Serbia is the foremost real result of the Albanian policies of the Serbian government. The second and more dangerous result is the strengthening of two big powers in Albania, which have the greatest interests in the Balkans”.

A quotation from 1999? No, this is the quintessence of the lesson which Dimitrije Tucovic drew in 1914 from the experience of the war, which he had shared personally. The war aimed at opening the way to the Mediterranean Sea for the Serbian bougeoisie; as a result, the overwhelmingly Albanian Kosovo became a victim — in Tucovic’s words — of Serbian colonialism.

Dimitrije Tucovic was the leader of the left faction of the Social-democratic Party of Serbia before World War I. Together with the faction of the “narrows” in the Bulgarian SP and Lenin’s Russian Bolsheviks, this Serbian party was the only one to remain internationalist during WW1 and to deny war credits to its own bourgeoisie. This Marxist position had also been defended by Tucovic in the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, which immediately preceded the world war.

The study “Serbia and Albania” reviewed here, which the Vienna-based AGM deserves thanks for republishing last year in both Serbo-Croatian and German, was first published in Belgrade in 1914.

D. Tucovic, who had been forced to take part in the war against Albania (at that time still part of the Ottoman empire), first describes the socio-economic structures of Albania and counterposes a materialistic view [sic] of its social and cultural underdevelopment, whose victims the Albanians had become in the course of history, to the already widespread chauvinist Serbian propaganda against the Albanian ‘savages’.

In three further chapters he shows the development of the Albanian national movement, the economic and strategic interests of the regional powers and finally the development of the policies of the Serbian bourgeoisie towards the Albanians.
Precisely for those Serb- or Yugoslav-nationalist leftists in our country, who for some time have developed a tendency to view Albanians as ‘ethno-terrorists’, tools of NATO and drug-traffickers, the parallel with the social and political development of the Kurds, so beloved by the same political milieu, and with the unfavorable image of the Kurds held by their neighbouring peoples, is often striking.

Dimitrije Tucovic is an invaluable spokesman for the internationalist position, otherwise linked with the name of Lenin, which holds that the only possible progressive solution to the problems resulting from the ethnic diversity of the Balkans is unity within a federation of Balkan states on the basis of total free will. He shows how the disregard of such a position by Serbia’s ruling class has furthered the national awakening of the Albanians and the interests of imperialism. At the end of his study he writes about the failure of the Serbian push to the Mediterranean Sea:

“Since the long series of dangers and sacrifices for the freedom of the Serb people and the future of Serbia has not ended with the defeat of the policy of conquest, it is now necessary to face the truth and to acknowledge against all prejudices that the struggle that the Albanian tribe is leading today is a natural and unavoidable historic struggle for a different political life than that experienced under Turkish rule – different also from that which its neighbours Serbia, Greece and Montenegro would like to force upon the Albanians. The free Serbian people should appreciate this struggle, first because of the freedom of the Albanians, and second because of its own freedom, and it should deny every government the means for a policy of oppression. ”

The Stalinization of the Yugoslav CP, the multinational successor to the SDPS, has unfortunately blocked this perspective. The fact that this region in so many respects stands again today in the same position where it stood in 1914 according to Tucovic is the sad result.

The AGM’s pamphlet is supplemented by a biographical section on Tucovic and by a chapter titled ‘Revolutionary tradition - the Serbian workers’ movement from 1870 to World War I’. There is also a foreword that makes some critical points about Tucovic’s presentation and his position on the Balkan federation.

Dimitrije Tucovic: Serbia and Albania Publ. by Arbeitsgruppe Marxismus), Wien 1999, 91 p. , DM 12, -. orders to: AGM, PF 562, A-1151 Wien or E-Mail

François said...

I have found an interesting article by Dubravka Stojanović in “Helsinška povelja” and guess how? Thanks to an Albanian commenting here:
by Dubravka Stojanović, Translated from “Helsinška povelja” 103-4, January-February 2007

Ever since Martti Ahtisaari made his plan public, we have been hearing the most unbelievable pronouncements coming from Serbian officials concerning Kosovo’s future status. Whether ‘imaginative’ or ‘threatening’, they have the following in common: they are formulated in such a way as to prepare public opinion for a Serbian refusal to accept the international community’s decision.

An imaginary Kosovo

As in all previous years, their statements address only an imaginary Kosovo. During the parliamentary session at which the Resolution on Kosovo was adopted, no one (except the deputies of the coalition around the Liberal-Democrats) spoke about the concrete political questions that would be posed if by some miracle Kosovo were to remain in Serbia. No one spoke, for example, about how the Serbian army and police would enter Kosovo, given that only the presence of such instruments of force testifies to real national sovereignty. No one spoke about how Kosovo citizens would vote in Serbian parliamentary elections, or how the Serbian elite would deal with Albanian deputies in parliament and Albanian ministers in Serbian governments. What sort of educational system would there be? How would the Battle of Kosovo and the Balkan Wars be taught? Would it be in the spirit of ‘the only truth’, ‘our truth’, as our current educational authorities like to say? During all these years, ever since Kosovo was separated from Serbia, I have heard no explication of such questions, because no one ever mentions Kosovo’s population. What is talked about in such conversations is only ‘Kosovo’ - a Kosovo that does not exist in reality, a Kosovo without the people.

It is my view that Serbia lost Kosovo essentially on that issue. For the Serbian political and intellectual class, Kosovo never implied its inhabitants, but only territory - an imaginary territory torn out of time, torn from reality. A battlefield without people, in the year 1389! This is why the debate on whether Kosovo will be lost in 2007 or whether that happened in 1999 is superfluous in my view. Taking into account all the relevant data, I think it happened in 1912, the moment when, five centuries after the celebrated battle, the territory in question was absorbed into the Serbian state.

What is the whole thing all about? Immediately after the start of the first Balkan War in 1912, the Serbian army promptly entered the territory of Kosovo; when peace was signed the region was joined to Serbia, along with Sandžak and Macedonia. The papers of the time were full of patriotic outbursts, declaring that Kosovo had been avenged, that Lazar’s promise had been fulfilled, that the medieval Serbian state had been resurrected, that the old pledge had been redeemed… At that moment even the habitually cynical Jovan Skerlić was swept along by the patriotic surge. All was exalted and patriotic until the question arose of what kind of government would be established for Kosovo: i.e. a question similar to that which meets with no reply today either. A very interesting debate opened up in the national assembly, which needs to be recalled if we are to think seriously about the very difficult question: how was it possible that within less than a century Serbia lost part of its territory - a part, moreover, that its highest representatives insist is a holy place?

Occupied territory

Back in 1913 the issue acquired the name of ‘regulation of the new territories’. The governing Radical Party, led by Nikola Pašić, argued that a separate military-police regime should be introduced there. During the parliamentary and public debate, government officials insisted that the inhabitants of those territories were not sufficiently civilised, that they were not sufficiently politically mature, and that the Serbian democratic constitution could not be extended to those lands because their inhabitants would not know what to do with the rights it granted. The deputies worried about what would happen if the inhabitants of the ‘new territories’ gained equal voting rights, how this would influence the political balance inside Serbia itself, what would happen to the established relationship between the parties, and whether this might not bring down the government. Asked by the parliamentary opposition whether the government intended to consult the inhabitants of the ‘new territories’ on the form of government to be imposed, Stojan Protić [a prominent Radical] replied: ‘We did not consult them about their liberation either, which is why our brethren would surely permit us to govern them for five or six years in the manner we deem best. It is because we know better than they how to do it, because we are older and more mature, that we do not feel bound to ask them how they should be governed.’

This question divided the parties at the time. The otherwise conservative Progressive Party demanded that the constitution promptly be extended to the annexed lands, and advocated the convening of a Grand Assembly at which a revision of the 1903 constitution would be carried out. Its deputies argued that Serbian democracy was being tested, and that Serbs should remain consistent opponents of any division between higher and lower races (the effects of which they themselves had experienced). Opposing the government, the Independent Radical Party wrote at the time in its paper Odjek [Echo]: ‘The Radicals have proclaimed half of [the new] Serbia to be their pashalik. Through their minister of the interior they have proclaimed half of Serbia not to be Serbia, and on the territory which they consider not to be Serbian they have installed a regime of their own choosing.’ The Social Democrats were the most vociferous. They wrote in their Radničke novine [Workers’ News]: ‘One can make all sorts of criticism of the Turkish constitution, but one thing is for certain: on entering these lands Serbia should not have moved back from it but instead marched forward - promptly replacing the limited and false Turkish constitution with a true constitution, turning the patriarchal and primitive municipal self-government into a modern one, and giving the population an opportunity to feel itself to be really in Europe rather than treating it as a conquered people.’ Responding to the government’s analogy of democracy with swimming, and the argument that the population of the ‘new territories’ could not yet swim, the Social-Democrats responded: ‘Can a child ever learn to swim, unless it first jumps into the water?’

The weighty and interesting debate which took place in 1913 (of a kind that we have not had during the past decade or so) did not bear fruit, in that a decree on the new territories was adopted by virtue of which Kosovo was placed under military-police administration. The constitution was not extended to Serbia’s new territories, and their citizens did not gain the same rights as those enjoyed by the inhabitants of Serbia proper. A key role in this outcome was played by the conspirators gathered around Apis and the Black Hand. It was they, in fact, who directed Serbia’s foreign policy, and who in many ways proved stronger than the Radical government that they had brought to power after assassinating the last Obrenović [in 1903]. They were given the newly annexed territories as a kind of personal fiefdom, in which their power had no bounds.

Kosovo ‘lost’ in 1913

Another problem for the population of the annexed area was that police, military and civilian officials preferred not to be posted there. Being sent there was in the nature of a punishment The officials posted to the annexed area were ones who had been found guilty back in Serbia of corruption, or of physical brutality towards prisoners. It was an administration based on convicts and retired soldiers, who governed without any supervision. This is why I think that Kosovo was ‘lost’ before it had been ‘gained’. It was ‘lost’ because of the way in which the Serbians thought about it, because of its place in the myth-prone national ideology, and because of the inability of the ruling elites to accept and understand reality. While seeking to ‘free and unite the Serb people’ and to create a large national state, Serbian politicians proved unable to rule the annexed lands in a way that would make the new inhabitants accept the new state as their own. This was true of the expanded Serbia in 1913 as well as of all subsequent Yugoslavias. Their attitude towards ‘the other’ excluded tolerance and equality.

Their understanding of the state, in other words, never went beyond the pre-modern period. The state remained an abstraction, rather like Kosovo. It seems to me, therefore, that we are witnessing the end of a policy, not that of Milošević but one that was ideologically formed at the start of the history of the modern Serbian state. The denouement in Kosovo is also the dissolution of that national ideology, the end of a certain way of perceiving ourselves and others, space and time. It represents the final defeat of a stubborn refusal to understand the world and historical circumstances, and critically to confront ourselves. It is the end of a national arrogance and a distorted perception of reality.

François said...

In the original article by Dubravka Stojanović's in "Helsinška povelja", there is a final paragraph which the "Bosnia Report" failed to translate, and I really wonder why since it is no less interesting tha the rest.
Here is my translation:

"All this is why I am beginning to think that Dobrica Ćosić was right. Now I think that his formula that Serbia won in wars but lost in peace is correct. Only, it wasn't because of the 'unfairness of the Great powers' as he understood it, but because it couldn't attach to itself 'what it had gained at war' through a clever, reasoned and civilized policy. It hasn't been able to 'adopt' what it had 'conquered'."

As regards the "Free Republic" website, I was thrown out twice without warning nor explanation --and all my posts deleted -- because I was refuting pseudo-nationalist Serb propaganda there. This deserves to be investigated.

Remember what Ed Vulliamy said about the Serbs' abuse of their positions in the most unlikely places.

"the pivot of 'Living Marxism''s activities in the mainstream is, for some reason, 'the Economist Intelligence Unit', which has at times, backstage, been torn asunder by arguments over key positions held by the group's leading members.

"Two of these are a Serb called Laza Kekic, the author of some of the most virulent attacks on the 'bloody liberals', and Joan Phillips, who also works under the name Joan Hoey. This is the text of an email that came my way from Kekic to Hoey, written after the Nato bombardment of 1995 that produced the Dayton agreement:

'The Serbs have come back from far more difficult moments in the past. In the meantime, should accept and swallow a lot and consolidate what's left. Can even do Eurospeak and fluff on about the Balkan peace and co-operation in the meantime. Then, at some future date, the obliteration of the Muslims, the Albanians, and last of all the Croats. That's my perspective. And there's little else left to say'.

"Indeed there isn't. The message was sent from Kekic's electronic address at the 'Economist Intelligence Unit' on September 14, 1995, at 10.11am. Others in the series of emails involve chatter about gainful contact with David Owen and friendly journalists at the BBC and 'Observer'.",2763,184815,00.html